The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An important criterion is the ability to achieve allocative efficiency. Gode and Sunder (1993) shows that a continuous double auction for singleunit trades leads to an efficient allocation even when the traders exhibit “zero-intelligence”; in other words, market protocols are active contributors in the search for a better outcome. Under reasonable circumstances, most of the commonly used market protocols share the ability to help traders discover an efficient allocation
When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much t...
Can a negotiation protocol be both fair and “envy-free” when more than two agents are involved? The ...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An important criterion is the abili...
This paper studies the performance of four market protocols with regard to allocative efficiency and...
This paper studies the continuous double auction from the point of view of market engineering: we tw...
Abstract. We study the performance of four market protocols that lead to allocative ef-ficiency: bat...
Abstract. This paper studies the continuous double auction from the point of view of market engineer...
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
This paper explores alternatives to the vVa1rasian Auctioneer for the allocation of resources in a p...
Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. The ...
Most assets clear independently rather than jointly. This paper presents a model based on the unifor...
We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a ...
When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much t...
Can a negotiation protocol be both fair and “envy-free” when more than two agents are involved? The ...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An important criterion is the abili...
This paper studies the performance of four market protocols with regard to allocative efficiency and...
This paper studies the continuous double auction from the point of view of market engineering: we tw...
Abstract. We study the performance of four market protocols that lead to allocative ef-ficiency: bat...
Abstract. This paper studies the continuous double auction from the point of view of market engineer...
In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
This paper explores alternatives to the vVa1rasian Auctioneer for the allocation of resources in a p...
Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. The ...
Most assets clear independently rather than jointly. This paper presents a model based on the unifor...
We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a ...
When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much t...
Can a negotiation protocol be both fair and “envy-free” when more than two agents are involved? The ...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...