Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations. This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharing monetary rewards. But even when not just one kind of monetary tokens is distributed efficiency and fairness are less influential. We investigate and confirm this frame dependency more systematically by comparing net-trade-proposals and payoff-proposals for the same exchange economy with two traders, two commodities and multi-period-negotiations.
Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness...
This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploi...
The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An important criterion is the abili...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) have shown that part...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experim...
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of ...
Experimental games are small, but expanding branch of economics. The major part of economics deals w...
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experim...
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that o...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl experimentally test a labor market in which worker effort levels are ch...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
We present a simple mechanism that can be implemented in a simple experiment. In a modified trust ga...
Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness...
This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploi...
The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An important criterion is the abili...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) have shown that part...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experim...
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of ...
Experimental games are small, but expanding branch of economics. The major part of economics deals w...
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experim...
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that o...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl experimentally test a labor market in which worker effort levels are ch...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
We present a simple mechanism that can be implemented in a simple experiment. In a modified trust ga...
Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness...
This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploi...
The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An important criterion is the abili...