Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations. This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharing monetary rewards. But even when not just one kind of monetary tokens is distributed efficiency and fairness are less influential. We investigate and confirm this frame dependency more systematically by comparing net-trade-proposals and payoff-proposals for the same exchange economy with two traders, two commodities and multi-period-negotiations
Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness...
Substantial evidence has been accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Na...
We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate eit...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) have shown that part...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experim...
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of ...
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that o...
Experimental games are small, but expanding branch of economics. The major part of economics deals w...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl experimentally test a labor market in which worker effort levels are ch...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predic-tions, but with diffe...
Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness...
Substantial evidence has been accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Na...
We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate eit...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995, ) have shown that part...
Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that partic...
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experim...
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of ...
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that o...
Experimental games are small, but expanding branch of economics. The major part of economics deals w...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl experimentally test a labor market in which worker effort levels are ch...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predic-tions, but with diffe...
Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness...
Substantial evidence has been accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Na...
We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate eit...