Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the evidence for sentience in invertebrates. They do not offer any examples, however, of how their welfare should be considered or improved. We draw on animal welfare science to suggest some ways that would not be excessively demanding
Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as...
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but w...
Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the ...
Mikhalevich and Powell (2020) argue that it is both scientifically and morally wrong to dismiss the ...
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and cap...
Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) set up the basic criteria for according moral status equitably, including...
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sent...
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that certain cognitive-affective biases might distort people’s considerat...
—Commentary on Mikhalevich and Powell on invertebrate minds.— Whether or not arthropods are sentient...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that we should attribute moral standing not only to vertebrates bu...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in an...
There is no way to include invertebrates within the moral sphere without being “extreme” — to use Mi...
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to ...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) review evidence that invertebrates have the capacity to suffer. If they ...
Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as...
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but w...
Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the ...
Mikhalevich and Powell (2020) argue that it is both scientifically and morally wrong to dismiss the ...
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and cap...
Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) set up the basic criteria for according moral status equitably, including...
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sent...
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that certain cognitive-affective biases might distort people’s considerat...
—Commentary on Mikhalevich and Powell on invertebrate minds.— Whether or not arthropods are sentient...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that we should attribute moral standing not only to vertebrates bu...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in an...
There is no way to include invertebrates within the moral sphere without being “extreme” — to use Mi...
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to ...
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) review evidence that invertebrates have the capacity to suffer. If they ...
Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as...
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but w...
Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates...
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