International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys- tems where secrets and observables can alternate during the computation. We show that the information-theoretic approach which interprets such systems as (simple) noisy channels is no longer valid. However, the principle can be recovered if we consider channels of a more complicated kind, that in Information Theory are known as channels with memory and feedback. We show that there is a complete correspondence between interactive systems and such channels. Furthermore, we show that the capacity of the channels associated to such systems is a continuous function with respect to a pseudometric based on the Kantorovich metric
International audienceInformation flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of informa...
We put forward a general model intended for assessment of system security against passive eavesdropp...
International audienceIn information-hiding, an adversary that tries to infer the secret information...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining a measure of information leakage in intera...
peer reviewedWe consider the problem of quantifying information flow in interactive systems, modelle...
International audienceWe address the problem of computing the information leakage of a system in an ...
The main problem addressed by this thesis is that of characterising information leakage channels in...
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
Information leakage occurs when a system exposes its secret information to an unauthorised entity. I...
Classical quantitative information flow analysis often considers a system as an information-theoreti...
International audienceIn recent years, there has been a growing interest in considering the probabil...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
International audienceInformation flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of informa...
We put forward a general model intended for assessment of system security against passive eavesdropp...
International audienceIn information-hiding, an adversary that tries to infer the secret information...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining a measure of information leakage in intera...
peer reviewedWe consider the problem of quantifying information flow in interactive systems, modelle...
International audienceWe address the problem of computing the information leakage of a system in an ...
The main problem addressed by this thesis is that of characterising information leakage channels in...
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
Information leakage occurs when a system exposes its secret information to an unauthorised entity. I...
Classical quantitative information flow analysis often considers a system as an information-theoreti...
International audienceIn recent years, there has been a growing interest in considering the probabil...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
International audienceInformation flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of informa...
We put forward a general model intended for assessment of system security against passive eavesdropp...
International audienceIn information-hiding, an adversary that tries to infer the secret information...