International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive systems where secrets and observables can alternate during the computation. We show that the information-theoretic approach which interprets such systems as (simple) noisy channels is not valid anymore. However, the principle can be retrieved if we consider more complicated types of channels, that in Information Theory are known as channels with memory and feedback. We show that there is a complete correspondence between interactive systems and such kind of channels. Furthermore, we show that the capacity of the channels associated to such systems is a continuous function of the Kantorovich metric
The observable output of a probabilistic system that processes a secret input might reveal some info...
Classical quantitative information flow analysis often considers a system as an information-theoreti...
We put forward a general model intended for assessment of system security against passive eavesdropp...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining a measure of information leakage in intera...
peer reviewedWe consider the problem of quantifying information flow in interactive systems, modelle...
The main problem addressed by this thesis is that of characterising information leakage channels in...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
International audienceWe address the problem of computing the information leakage of a system in an ...
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
International audienceIn recent years, there has been a growing interest in considering the probabil...
Information leakage occurs when a system exposes its secret information to an unauthorised entity. I...
International audienceInformation flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of informa...
The observable output of a probabilistic system that processes a secret input might reveal some info...
Classical quantitative information flow analysis often considers a system as an information-theoreti...
We put forward a general model intended for assessment of system security against passive eavesdropp...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive sys...
International audienceWe consider the problem of defining a measure of information leakage in intera...
peer reviewedWe consider the problem of quantifying information flow in interactive systems, modelle...
The main problem addressed by this thesis is that of characterising information leakage channels in...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
International audienceWe address the problem of computing the information leakage of a system in an ...
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems...
Secrecy is fundamental to computer security, but real systems often cannot avoid leaking some secret...
International audienceIn recent years, there has been a growing interest in considering the probabil...
Information leakage occurs when a system exposes its secret information to an unauthorised entity. I...
International audienceInformation flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of informa...
The observable output of a probabilistic system that processes a secret input might reveal some info...
Classical quantitative information flow analysis often considers a system as an information-theoreti...
We put forward a general model intended for assessment of system security against passive eavesdropp...