The minimax theorem for zero-sum games is easily proved from the strong duality theorem of linear programming. For the converse direction, the standard proof by Dantzig (1951) is known to be incomplete. We explain and combine classical theorems about solving linear equations with nonnegative variables to give a correct alternative proof, more directly than Adler (2013). We also extend Dantzig's game so that any max-min strategy gives either an optimal LP solution or shows that none exists.Comment: v3: Theorem 7 with new proof that does NOT use LP duality, now achieving the same as Brooks/Ren
AbstractThis paper offers an alternative proof of the so-called fundamental theorem of the theory of...
We give a simpler, easier-to-check, version of the theorem of the paper referred to, i.e., a necessa...
Cilj ovog rada je razviti teorijske koncepte i računske tehnike linearnog programiranja i teorije i...
In 1951, Dantzig showed the equivalence of linear programming problems and two-person zero-sum games...
In this paper we discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for different minimax results to hold u...
textabstractIn this paper we discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for different minimax resul...
Includes bibliographical references (page 61)This paper is a study of the related mathematical subje...
The purpose of the thesis is the examination of the Minimax Theorem of the Theory of Games. Consider...
Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel showed how to efficiently compute minimax strategies for two-player ...
We show that in zero-sum polymatrix games, a multiplayer generalization of two-person zero-sum games...
In this paper we review known minimax results with applications in game theory and showthat these re...
This article is a follow-up to an earlier paper by Marchi [1967] in which the minimax theorem is pro...
We apply linear and non-linear programming to find the solutions for Nash equilibriums and Nash arbi...
Zero-sum games with incomplete information are formulated as linear programs in which the players' ...
International audienceZero-sum games with incomplete information are formulated as linear programs i...
AbstractThis paper offers an alternative proof of the so-called fundamental theorem of the theory of...
We give a simpler, easier-to-check, version of the theorem of the paper referred to, i.e., a necessa...
Cilj ovog rada je razviti teorijske koncepte i računske tehnike linearnog programiranja i teorije i...
In 1951, Dantzig showed the equivalence of linear programming problems and two-person zero-sum games...
In this paper we discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for different minimax results to hold u...
textabstractIn this paper we discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for different minimax resul...
Includes bibliographical references (page 61)This paper is a study of the related mathematical subje...
The purpose of the thesis is the examination of the Minimax Theorem of the Theory of Games. Consider...
Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel showed how to efficiently compute minimax strategies for two-player ...
We show that in zero-sum polymatrix games, a multiplayer generalization of two-person zero-sum games...
In this paper we review known minimax results with applications in game theory and showthat these re...
This article is a follow-up to an earlier paper by Marchi [1967] in which the minimax theorem is pro...
We apply linear and non-linear programming to find the solutions for Nash equilibriums and Nash arbi...
Zero-sum games with incomplete information are formulated as linear programs in which the players' ...
International audienceZero-sum games with incomplete information are formulated as linear programs i...
AbstractThis paper offers an alternative proof of the so-called fundamental theorem of the theory of...
We give a simpler, easier-to-check, version of the theorem of the paper referred to, i.e., a necessa...
Cilj ovog rada je razviti teorijske koncepte i računske tehnike linearnog programiranja i teorije i...