Determinants of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes

This thesis examines the relationship between the two driving forces that pose a threat to the survival of authoritarian regimes. I argue that a vertical threat (popular protests) increases the likelihood of a lateral threat (pre-electoral opposition coordination) in electoral authoritarian regimes based on three theoretical frameworks: (i.) Transforming a popular unrest, which is directed to the incumbent party, to an incentive for the members of opposition parties to deal with the authoritarian politics, (ii.) being open to hear new strategies on getting away with the incumbent party and making the dissatisfaction more vocal, and (iii.) highlighting the need for a pivotal actor in popular protests are the main theoretical mechanisms leading to opposition coordination on pre-electoral issues. The empirical findings on 97 elections from 42 countries demonstrate that popular protests increase the probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes whereas the probability does not increase in competitive authoritarian regimes. Moreover, this statistical evidence is also provided for the other measures of protests such as violent and non-violent forms, but this effect is substantially more essential for peaceful protests. Lastly, investigation on the theoretical relationship between the two driving forces of the process of democratization provides analytical and empirical background to the contemporary literature on democratizatio