(Non)-violent mass mobilization and the survival of authoritarian regimes

This thesis analyzes the question whether violent or nonviolent protest is more threating for the survival of authoritarian regimes. Based on previous literature, I argue that protest in general and violent protest in countries with low state capacity should make regime collapse more likely. Furthermore, I take the repressive nature of autocratic regimes into account and argue that violent repression against peaceful protesters makes regime collapse more likely, while regimes employing violence against violent protest become more stable. I employ Cox Proportional Hazard Models and Conditional Gap Time Models to analyze the effect of protest and repression on the survival of authoritarian regimes and find support for my theory that protest makes regimes more prone to collapse in general, and that countries with low state capacity are more vulnerable to violent protest. I cannot find support for the hypothesis that violent repression against peaceful protest destabilizes a country, but I find that regimes using coercive measures against violent protest become more stable. However, this is only true when violent protest causes harm and death to others people.M.A.Includes bibliographical referencesby Jonas Stenge