Opposition strategy-formation in autocracies: a theory of coordination with evidence from Latin America

When and why do oppositions coordinate their actions against authoritarian regimes? This dissertation studies uneven patterns of opposition coordination in autocracies. By paying attention to the individual and collective dilemmas of opposition elites, this research challenges existing knowledge and the assumptions that scholars bring to the study of non-democratic regimes. In contrast to existing accounts that mostly focus on the behaviour and choices of the autocrat, my project provides insights into the micro-foundations of the decision-making and strategy-formation processes of opposition parties. This work also makes a conceptual contribution to the existing theories of non-democratic regimes explaining when and why coordination is more likely to happen. Based on 239 semi-structured interviews with opposition elites, academics, journalists, regime defectors, civil society members, amongst others, collected during iterative field research trips between 2014 and 2019 to the US, Mexico and Venezuela, this study hones in on repression as an explanatory variable for opposition strategic choices in autocracies. I have found that what shapes opponents’ decision-making and strategy-formation is the amount of repression they are facing and how repression is applied (targeted or indiscriminate). This dissertation disaggregates the concept of repression into violent and non-violent and singles out that the rulers deliberately choose who to repress and how much to repress to divide their opponents into irreconcilable camps. In a nutshell, this research argues that opposition coordination is only possible under two conditions: When repression is both moderate and indiscriminate. When repression is either low/high and/or targeted towards specific parties, coordination is less likely to occur.