Donald Davidson opens 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' by asking, 'What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?' His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting. © 2011 The Aristotelian Society
Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is t...
In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rat...
Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and just...
Donald Davidson opens 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' by asking, 'What is the relation between a reas...
This dissertation addresses the question, “What is the relation of reasons to actions?” Throughout t...
Davidson’s famous 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” contains, in nuce, the main lines of Dav...
Reasons for action are central in understanding persons and in describing their moral obligations. W...
I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I ar...
This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I wi...
Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, r...
Introduction My purpose in writing this thesis is to try to resolve a dispute over what kind of exp...
This thesis attempts to outline a causal theory of human action. This theory is intended to be a par...
ABSTRACT Comparing Perspectives on Cause and Reason in Intentional Action: ...
This paper considers Davidson’s (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to s...
I discuss the respective roles of traits and reasons in the explanation of action. I begin by notin...
Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is t...
In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rat...
Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and just...
Donald Davidson opens 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' by asking, 'What is the relation between a reas...
This dissertation addresses the question, “What is the relation of reasons to actions?” Throughout t...
Davidson’s famous 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” contains, in nuce, the main lines of Dav...
Reasons for action are central in understanding persons and in describing their moral obligations. W...
I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I ar...
This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I wi...
Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, r...
Introduction My purpose in writing this thesis is to try to resolve a dispute over what kind of exp...
This thesis attempts to outline a causal theory of human action. This theory is intended to be a par...
ABSTRACT Comparing Perspectives on Cause and Reason in Intentional Action: ...
This paper considers Davidson’s (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to s...
I discuss the respective roles of traits and reasons in the explanation of action. I begin by notin...
Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is t...
In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rat...
Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and just...