Agency and the causes of actions

This thesis attempts to outline a causal theory of human action. This theory is intended to be a partial explanation of what action is, and, specifically to illuminate the relation between actions and reasons. The starting point is Davidson's theory of action. Problems with this theory will be identified and distinguished. A set of conditions that a satisfactory theory of action must meet will be specified. First, that the theory should preserve the intuition that the relationship between reasons and actions is in some way causal. Second, that the theory should explain what actions are. Third, that a directness constraint be specified, that eliminates dependence on causal chains, and hence the possibility of deviant causal chains. Fourth, that the theory give a plausible role for the agent in his actions. Fifth, that the theory should not provide definite answers to questions of whether events are indeed actions, or indeed intentional actions, where our ordinary talk of actions and intentional actions does not provide such answers. I will consider what actions are, given that they cannot be whatever reasons cause. Hornsby's discussion in her Actions, will provide the focus of the debate. Pursuing the investigation of Hornsby's ideas, the possibility that the agent could be introduced into action by the device of describing actions as tryings will be considered. It will be concluded, first that actions or tryings are not the causes of bodily movements, and second, that a description of actions as tryings is not appropriate for the formulation of a causal theory of action. It will be argued that it is not strictly true that reasons cause actions, but rather that actions occur when reasons directly cause bodily movements, where the reasons and bodily movements are of a sort explained. An account of how a causal theory of action might involve the agent, based on Velleman's ideas, will be included in the theory. Finally, it will be argued that the final theory explains the possibility of uncertainty of whether an event is an action or intentional action