The metaphysics of morality : a dispositionalist account

Each of the following theses is independently plausible: Principle. Morality is principled: right-making factors or moral reasons entail corresponding moral principles. Conflict. Conflicts of moral obligation are possible and metaphysically unproblematic (even if they can be quite difficult--or even impossible--to resolve). Holism. Whether a given factor contributes to the rightness or wrongness of an action may depend on factors other than itself; hence, what is a right-making factor or moral reason to &phis; in one case may not be one in another, or may even be a wrong-making factor or moral reason not to & phis; given suitable circumstances. Nevertheless, neither Conflict nor Holism has fared particularly well in ethical theory, perhaps because neither is obviously consistent with Principle. Moreover, on one influential account of moral principles, Conflict and Holism would seem to be inconsistent with Principle. On this account, moral principles state what Ross calls "prima facie obligations". But if, as Ross appears to hold, prima facie obligations are not genuine obligations and genuine obligations cannot conflict, then Conflict is inconsistent with Principle. And if, as many hold, prima facie obligations correspond to factors that are always right- making factors or moral reasons to &phis;, then Holism is inconsistent with Principle. An adequate moral metaphysic would reconcile these three theses: it would both show them to be mutually consistent and explain them. An adequate moral metaphysic would also explain why moral principles are capable of playing the prominent and important roles they play in moral thought, practice, and theory. In this dissertation, I develop a moral metaphysic that takes moral dispositions or powers to be the fundamental units of moral explanation--that is, a moral- theoretic dispositionalism. On this view, right-making factors just are factors that have the power to make actions (prima facie) obligatory, and moral principles ascribe moral dispositions to sorts or kinds of actions, states of affairs, beings, institutions, and the like. This view explains why moral principles can play the roles they do in moral thought, practice, and theory. It shows Principle, Conflict, and Holism to be mutually consistent. And it explains each of the