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For philosophers who seek to give an account of the nature of moral properties, an important first step is to identify the platitudes of moral discourse. These platitudes establish the roles that moral properties are thought to play, such that any property that might plausibly be identified with moral wrongness (for example) must be well-suited to fill that role: it should be objective, normative, categorical, authoritative, knowable, and unified. Within the framework of metaphysical naturalism, it is very difficult to find any suitable candidates to play this role. Traditional theism, on the other hand, brings with it conceptual resources that are more than adequate to ground a robust moral realism. Divine commands and divine attitudes are both good candidates to play the role established by moral discourse for moral properties. Contrary to much received philosophical wisdom, metaethical accounts that imply the dependence of moral facts upon theological facts do not face any insuperable difficulties. Worries that theistic metaethical accounts imply a variety of untoward consequences—e.g. that there are nearby possible worlds in which nothing is morally ii