The Life of the Aesthetically Virtuous

Philosophers working on aesthetic normativity have focused almost exclusively on individual aesthetic judgments, ignoring the quality of aesthetic lives overall.  I argue that in the aesthetic domain, we ought to cultivate virtuous aesthetic characters, and not merely aim to make correct token aesthetic judgments. I develop a theory of virtuous aesthetic character and then use it to address two older debates. The first debate concerns the normative constraints on appreciation.  If we are interested in cultivating aesthetic character, ought the objects of aesthetic appreciation be experienced or judged from a disinterested, universal perspective or based on personal interest or idiosyncrasy? I argue that disinterest and idiosyncratic or personal reflection are not mutually exclusive: the virtue of disinterest enables rich aesthetic experiences, supports a flourishing aesthetic life, and actually promotes profound personal (even idiosyncratic) self-reflection.  The second, older debate concerns what kind of objects ought to be sought out for aesthetic experiences.  Should we seek out experiences of nature, fine art, or everyday objects if our goal is to cultivate a virtuous aesthetic character? I assert that all of these categories of objects are able to occasion the right kind of aesthetic experience that cultivates a virtuous character. However, the object must be viewed in a way that is most typically reserved for the way that one views the objects of nature—that is, as empty of determinate purpose, reason, or end. That way, the viewer is able to engage in the process of appreciation without practical constraints. She is thereby more receptive to the indeterminate purposes of the object of appreciation, and able to meet the demands issued by the object. In doing these things, I argue that she cultivates the virtues of receptivity and imagination. By coming to these questions from the perspective of virtue aesthetics, I am able to advance these debates in novel and productive ways. Of course, many of these ideas are recognizably Kantian in origin. I don’t intend for this account to be merely a defense of Kant (though a reading and defense is included), but rather an original neo-Kantian account. I am asking a question, however, that Kant never asked: “what reason do we have to prefer one aesthetic life over another?” I will show why my account of cultivating a virtuous aesthetic character is the best answer to this question