In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide optimal solutions for addressing managerial moral hazard problems. We analyze a model with multiple projects where the manager obtains private information about their quality after the contract with investors is agreed. The likelihood of success of each project depends on both its quality and the level of effort exerted on it by the manager. We find distributions of the quality shock such that the optimal financial contract requires the investor to hold an equity claim. Our model addresses issues that are relevant for financial intermediation and corporate governance
We study capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading, thereby...
International audienceThis paper deals with financial contracting between a lender and a borrower wi...
This paper proposes a historically-grounded mechanism-design model of corporate finance, with two-si...
In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide optimal solutions for addressing manage...
This paper presents a theory of outside equity based on the control rights and the maturity design o...
We develop a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which investors face moral hazard pro...
This paper considers the impact of finance on growth by exploring a model where entrepreneurs need b...
In the first chapter, Option-like Contracts for Innovation and Production, we model how firms motiva...
This paper considers the impact of financial contracting on growth by exploring a model where entrep...
We consider project financing under adverse selection and moral hazard and derive several interestin...
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable...
In Chapter 1, by using a simple model with moral hazard and managerial entrenchment, I derive the op...
Using a principal-agent model in which an entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depen...
We analyse the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
We study capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading, thereby...
We study capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading, thereby...
International audienceThis paper deals with financial contracting between a lender and a borrower wi...
This paper proposes a historically-grounded mechanism-design model of corporate finance, with two-si...
In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide optimal solutions for addressing manage...
This paper presents a theory of outside equity based on the control rights and the maturity design o...
We develop a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which investors face moral hazard pro...
This paper considers the impact of finance on growth by exploring a model where entrepreneurs need b...
In the first chapter, Option-like Contracts for Innovation and Production, we model how firms motiva...
This paper considers the impact of financial contracting on growth by exploring a model where entrep...
We consider project financing under adverse selection and moral hazard and derive several interestin...
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable...
In Chapter 1, by using a simple model with moral hazard and managerial entrenchment, I derive the op...
Using a principal-agent model in which an entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depen...
We analyse the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric inf...
We study capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading, thereby...
We study capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading, thereby...
International audienceThis paper deals with financial contracting between a lender and a borrower wi...
This paper proposes a historically-grounded mechanism-design model of corporate finance, with two-si...