Using a principal-agent model in which an entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depend on his effort, which is not observable by the financier, the author shows that the optimal contract used to finance such a project can be replicated by a unique combination of debt and equity, proving the optimality of these financial instruments. ; A look at the evolution of the collection, clearinghouse, and regulatory provisions of the Federal Reserve Act. The Reserve Banks’ check collection service was designed in 1913 to serve as "glue," attaching the new central bank to the commercial and financial markets through member banks.Contracts ; Corporations - Finance
This paper studies the optimal financing (capital structure) of entrepreneurial activity in the cont...
In Chapter 1, by using a simple model with moral hazard and managerial entrenchment, I derive the op...
Julkaistu vain painettuna, saatavuus katso Bibid. Published only in printed form, availability see B...
Dewatripont and Tirole showed (for the first time) that a mix of debt and equity is optimal and thus...
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays on financial contracting theory. In ...
In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide optimal solutions for addressing manage...
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bank-ruptcy rules into a theory of optimal ...
This paper studies financial contracting in a two-period financing model with double moral hazard, a...
Using an artiele by Garvey and Swan (GS) 1992 as a benchmark, we extend their model to deal with th...
In this article we propose a security-design problem in which risk neutral entrepreneurs make unobse...
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable...
This paper proposes a historically-grounded mechanism-design model of corporate finance, with two-si...
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiabl...
We develop a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which investors face moral hazard pro...
Our paper explores the optimal financial contract for a large investor with potential control over a...
This paper studies the optimal financing (capital structure) of entrepreneurial activity in the cont...
In Chapter 1, by using a simple model with moral hazard and managerial entrenchment, I derive the op...
Julkaistu vain painettuna, saatavuus katso Bibid. Published only in printed form, availability see B...
Dewatripont and Tirole showed (for the first time) that a mix of debt and equity is optimal and thus...
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays on financial contracting theory. In ...
In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide optimal solutions for addressing manage...
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bank-ruptcy rules into a theory of optimal ...
This paper studies financial contracting in a two-period financing model with double moral hazard, a...
Using an artiele by Garvey and Swan (GS) 1992 as a benchmark, we extend their model to deal with th...
In this article we propose a security-design problem in which risk neutral entrepreneurs make unobse...
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable...
This paper proposes a historically-grounded mechanism-design model of corporate finance, with two-si...
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiabl...
We develop a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which investors face moral hazard pro...
Our paper explores the optimal financial contract for a large investor with potential control over a...
This paper studies the optimal financing (capital structure) of entrepreneurial activity in the cont...
In Chapter 1, by using a simple model with moral hazard and managerial entrenchment, I derive the op...
Julkaistu vain painettuna, saatavuus katso Bibid. Published only in printed form, availability see B...