Add to ORKGCentro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN / CINDOC - Centro de Informaciòn y Documentaciòn CientìficaSIGLEESSpai
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market ma...
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can e...
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can e...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of "many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences ove...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
We are very grateful to José Alcalde, Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn, Joana Pais, and two anonymous...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matchin...
International audienceIn a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by...
Abstract: Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We deter-mine a...
Problemas de emparelhamentos estáveis consistem em dividir um ou mais grupos de agentes em pares, on...
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market ma...
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can e...
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can e...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of "many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences ove...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
We are very grateful to José Alcalde, Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn, Joana Pais, and two anonymous...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matchin...
International audienceIn a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by...
Abstract: Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We deter-mine a...
Problemas de emparelhamentos estáveis consistem em dividir um ou mais grupos de agentes em pares, on...
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market ma...