Add to ORKGIn the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one’s co-workers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: J41. 1997 Academic Press 1
A simple model of matching between two populations is proposed. Agents search for partners from the ...
This thesis gives a contribution to matching theory. It examines three one-to-one matching models: t...
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matchin...
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can e...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent's preferences not only depend on ...
In a coalitional two-sided matching problem agents on each side of the market may form coalitions su...
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market ma...
In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching...
International audienceIn a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by...
A stylized fact of most centralized matching markets (for example school choice problems is that pa...
A simple model of matching between two populations is proposed. Agents search for partners from the ...
This thesis gives a contribution to matching theory. It examines three one-to-one matching models: t...
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matchin...
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can e...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent's preferences not only depend on ...
In a coalitional two-sided matching problem agents on each side of the market may form coalitions su...
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market ma...
In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching...
International audienceIn a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by...
A stylized fact of most centralized matching markets (for example school choice problems is that pa...
A simple model of matching between two populations is proposed. Agents search for partners from the ...
This thesis gives a contribution to matching theory. It examines three one-to-one matching models: t...
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matchin...