The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have substitutable preferences. The algorithm starts by calculating the two optimal-stable matchings using the deferred-acceptance algorithm. Then, it computes each remaining stable matching as the firm-optimal stable matching corresponding to a new preference profile which is obtained after modifying the preferences of a previously identified sequence of firms.Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperación Científica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of J. Massó is also partially supported by Research Grants PB98-0870 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education an...
We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a dis...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
Stable matching is a widely studied problem in social choice theory. For the basiccentralized case, ...
We are grateful to a referee of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions. The work of R. Ma...
Abstract: In this paper we are concerned with describing an enumeration algorithm for the set of ma...
We are very grateful to José Alcalde, Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn, Joana Pais, and two anonymous...
We study the equivalences between two matching models, wherethe agents in one side of the market, th...
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preference...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We give a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for finding stable matchings that runs in O(m) time. Th...
We thank José Alcade, Howard Petith, Alvin Roth, and a referee for their helpful comments. Financial...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a dis...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
Stable matching is a widely studied problem in social choice theory. For the basiccentralized case, ...
We are grateful to a referee of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions. The work of R. Ma...
Abstract: In this paper we are concerned with describing an enumeration algorithm for the set of ma...
We are very grateful to José Alcalde, Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn, Joana Pais, and two anonymous...
We study the equivalences between two matching models, wherethe agents in one side of the market, th...
Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preference...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We give a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for finding stable matchings that runs in O(m) time. Th...
We thank José Alcade, Howard Petith, Alvin Roth, and a referee for their helpful comments. Financial...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a dis...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
Stable matching is a widely studied problem in social choice theory. For the basiccentralized case, ...