[[alternative]]Sexual Autonomy and Scientific Basis: Sexual Regulation Dimension of German Criminal Law

系統編號: PF10901-0606計畫編號: MOST107-2629-H343-001-MY3執行機構: 南華大學國際事務與企業學系研究期間: 10908~11007[[abstract]]本計畫第一部份（107年度）試圖探討現代國家刑法中性自主權概念的發展與法律界線的變動。藉著分析德國1973年第4次刑法修正案後學界對其知識論基礎的批判─特別是《金賽報告》（Kinsey Reports）中的性/別觀點─以對照台灣1999年刑法修正案的相關概念。就理論部分而言，本計畫擬運用傅科「自我的技術」觀點，深入討論性自主權的科學基底與法理論證。本計畫第二部份（108年度）試圖分析隱含在台灣和德國對於性工作管制政策中的性自主概念。德國在1973年至2002年間，將姓工作及其第三方完全除罪化。至2002年間，將性工作及其第三方完全除罪化。相對地，在1999年之前，台灣刑法對於性工作者的規範僅限於「非良家婦女之女性」，對性工作第三方的刑事懲處，則是自1999年修法後首見於刑231。本計畫試圖探討台灣當時修法的根本考量及德國對性工作（及其第三方）皆除罪化的法理決斷。本計畫第三部份（109年度）探討德國在1973年第4次刑法修正案後，對未成年者的性管制採取年齡界線：14歲以下者被視為尚無性自主權，然而，此觀點已受到學界質疑。而台灣在經歷1980年代後期的反雛妓運動之後，許多參與雛妓救援運動者紛紛在1990年代兒少保護的立法，企圖以國家權力維護未成年者的人權，而性產業也因此被認定為是必須受到懲處的罪魁禍首。最重要的是，德國法律學者赫爾伯特‧耶格（Herbert Jäger）曾指出，自20世紀60年代以來，西德的刑事立法在刑事政策思想方面發生了根本性的變化，對其合理性及理論和科學基礎的興趣越來越大。無論如何，對立法缺陷的認知以及在決定除罪化時是否需要科學的論證，已經有了相當的共識。因此在法律變革過程中，討論的關鍵主要集中在「由一個日趨理性的方法」來確定方向、標準和規範，在決策過程中更佳強化人文與社會科學研究成果的應用，同時增加了專家意見和專家聽證會。本計畫將運用此觀點，藉由德國學者探求法理源由的思考論證，提供台灣作為刑法性自主權相關規範的分析與反思。[[abstract]]The concept of sexual autonomy was introduced into West German jurisprudence with the Fourth Amendment of West German criminal law (4th StRG) on November 23, 1973, replacing “Offenses against Sexual Morality.” The aim of this amendment was to restrict the definition of criminal sexual behavior to only that which caused serious harm. This research project sets out a Foucauldian approach to the legal regulation of sex work and underage developed through an analysis of sexual autonomy.The clearly established concept of sexual autonomy was recently examined as an epistemological problem of perception. It is important to note that the German legislature's innovation of sexual autonomy also supported the development of a protection policy, which was very controversial with regard to certain sexual values, especially underage sex. Welter and Rind pointed out that Alfred Kinsey and his fellow interviewers reported that their first sexual experiences occurred mostly in the 1920s to the 1940s. At this time, in most social circles in the United States, there was a strong (mostly religious-based) taboo on sexuality in general. For this reason, these experiences took place in a discursive space. A general taboo weakens its own effect through its self-imposed silence. Many people were not aware of the numerous common negative concepts of classification and criminalization of sexuality. Thus, any sexuality in and of itself carried a general stigma, especially that relating to children and adolescents, but only rarely did people have a label for a specific stigmatization when an incident became publicly known. In other words, imposing legislation to regulate sexuality hardens age-specific distinctions among citizens, inevitably causing them to question the reasons for the affiliated legal penalties.Can Foucault's “technology of self” offer an epistemological explanation of different patterns of sexual offense legislation? When certain sexual offense laws are established, what happens to the demarcation line between sexual autonomy and that which is forbidden? How have certain kinds of sexual interdictions required changes from social morality to personal autonomy? Most discussions of the legislature's contributions to the development of Germany's criminal law focuses on innovations in the areas of sexual offenses, but Foucault's in-depth point of view may offer a new window into the interactions among sexual interdictions, legislative rationales, and moral offenses, informing our understanding of the relationship between state protection and sexual inequality