Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is worth pursuing. The case is philosophically uncontroversial under functionalism and reductive materialism. It is also highly heuristic, as it raises interesting issues for further investigation, such as the neural causation of behavior, the role of Mauthner cells in conditioned avoidance, and whether operant conditioning is constitutive of fish sentience
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Abstract: In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful ...
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid figh...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Arguments for fish sentience have difficulty with the philosophical zombie problem. Progress in AI h...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
Sneddon et al. address the scientists who reject the empirical evidence on fish sentience, calling t...
Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mam...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biologi...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Abstract: In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful ...
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid figh...
Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is ...
Arguments for fish sentience have difficulty with the philosophical zombie problem. Progress in AI h...
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization a...
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are senti...
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinop...
Sneddon et al. address the scientists who reject the empirical evidence on fish sentience, calling t...
Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mam...
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, be...
I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biologi...
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for consider...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Woodruff makes two arguments to support his claim that ray-finned fish are conscious: (1) Fish neuro...
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal...
Abstract: In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful ...
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid figh...