Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where managers pay much attention to league table rankings. This paper explores the strategic rationale for giving managers incentives based on market share, motivated by evidence from executive compensation practice in the automotive and investment banking industries. Strategic incentives for market share dominate the well-known sales revenue contracts analyzed in much of the literature, but perhaps surprisingly also lead to less competitive outcomes. The more general lesson is that, when competing in strategic substitutes, players will wish to commit to aggressive conduct, but also make their behaviour less manipulable by rivals
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
The paper examines the equilibrium relationship between managerial incentives and product market com...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where managers pay much attenti...
Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where man- agers pay much atten...
We show that managerial compensation levels and incentives inherit the strategic properties of the s...
In this paper, we consider a two-stage (sequential) game as introduced by Vickers (1985), Fershtman ...
We study a model in which a manager can engage in unobservable cost-cutting effort, possesses privat...
There is an ongoing theoretical debate about whether firm-owners would optimally use stronger or wea...
In strategic management, incentives are usually considered as the factors that induce desired behavi...
This paper argues that the presence of both profit-based and stock price-based components in compens...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take notonly product market but also takeov...
The paper investigates pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects the use of market share discounts (MSDs). Whi...
As a result of the agency problem, earnings management may take place due to the high contracting co...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
The paper examines the equilibrium relationship between managerial incentives and product market com...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where managers pay much attenti...
Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where man- agers pay much atten...
We show that managerial compensation levels and incentives inherit the strategic properties of the s...
In this paper, we consider a two-stage (sequential) game as introduced by Vickers (1985), Fershtman ...
We study a model in which a manager can engage in unobservable cost-cutting effort, possesses privat...
There is an ongoing theoretical debate about whether firm-owners would optimally use stronger or wea...
In strategic management, incentives are usually considered as the factors that induce desired behavi...
This paper argues that the presence of both profit-based and stock price-based components in compens...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take notonly product market but also takeov...
The paper investigates pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects the use of market share discounts (MSDs). Whi...
As a result of the agency problem, earnings management may take place due to the high contracting co...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
The paper examines the equilibrium relationship between managerial incentives and product market com...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...