Add to ORKGThe Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibrium multiplicity more acute. This paper selects amongst these equilibria in the following sense. If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using classical hypothesis testing, it is known that their strategies almost always approximate equilibria of the repeated game. It is shown here that if, in addition, they are sufficiently "conservative" in adopting their hypotheses, then almost all of the time is spent approximating an efficient subset of equilibria that share a "forgiving" property. This result provides theoretical justification for the general sense amongst practitioners that efficiency is focal in such games
I propose a strategy to identify structural parameters in infinitely repeated games without relying ...
The folk theorem suggests that finding Nash Equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in on...
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When ag...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilib...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilib...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games o®ers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibr...
In repeated games, equilibrium often requires that any deviation be punished in the continuation, re...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
This paper begins with a short foundational description of the basics\ud of game theory, focusing on...
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When ag...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is impatient, Pareto-superi...
© 2015 Mohr Siebeck. We study infinitely repeated games that are played by many groups simultaneousl...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
htmlabstractA well-known result in game theory known as “the Folk Theorem” suggests that finding Nas...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is patient and the other is...
I propose a strategy to identify structural parameters in infinitely repeated games without relying ...
The folk theorem suggests that finding Nash Equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in on...
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When ag...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilib...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilib...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games o®ers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibr...
In repeated games, equilibrium often requires that any deviation be punished in the continuation, re...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
This paper begins with a short foundational description of the basics\ud of game theory, focusing on...
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When ag...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is impatient, Pareto-superi...
© 2015 Mohr Siebeck. We study infinitely repeated games that are played by many groups simultaneousl...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
htmlabstractA well-known result in game theory known as “the Folk Theorem” suggests that finding Nas...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is patient and the other is...
I propose a strategy to identify structural parameters in infinitely repeated games without relying ...
The folk theorem suggests that finding Nash Equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in on...
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When ag...