Add to ORKGThe Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibrium multiplicity more acute. This paper selects amongst these equilibria in the following sense. If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using classical hypothesis testing, it is known that their strategies almost always approximate equilibria of the repeated game. It is shown here that if, in addition, they are sufficiently conservative in adopting their hypotheses, then almost all of the time is spent approximating an efficient subset of equilibria that share a forgiving property. This result provides theoretical justification for the general sense amongst practitioners that efficiency is focal in such games
This paper extends the convergence result in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b) to a class of games whe...
I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called “Experimental Equilibrium”, in whi...
If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using Bayesian learning, it is known that their...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games o®ers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibr...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilib...
In repeated games, equilibrium often requires that any deviation be punished in the continuation, re...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
A well-known result in game theory known as “the Folk Theorem” suggests that finding Nash equilibria...
The folk theorem suggests that finding Nash Equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in on...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is impatient, Pareto-superi...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is patient and the other is...
It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoff...
It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoff...
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others' actions in repeated game...
This paper extends the convergence result in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b) to a class of games whe...
I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called “Experimental Equilibrium”, in whi...
If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using Bayesian learning, it is known that their...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games o®ers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibr...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilib...
In repeated games, equilibrium often requires that any deviation be punished in the continuation, re...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
A well-known result in game theory known as “the Folk Theorem” suggests that finding Nash equilibria...
The folk theorem suggests that finding Nash Equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in on...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is impatient, Pareto-superi...
This study shows that in a two-player infinitely repeated game where one is patient and the other is...
It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoff...
It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoff...
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others' actions in repeated game...
This paper extends the convergence result in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b) to a class of games whe...
I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called “Experimental Equilibrium”, in whi...
If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using Bayesian learning, it is known that their...