Add to ORKGThis paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m × m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing states that allow Ellison's [Ellison, G., 2000. Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67, 17-45] "step-by-step" evolution to occur
We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjus...
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occ...
Evolution, Switching costs, Mixed-strategy equilibrium, Cycles, Stochastic stability,
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper models stochastic evolutionary coordination games with inertia driven by switching costs....
This paper models the phenomenon of inertia driven by individual strategy switching costs in a stoch...
A recent experimental study [Traulsen et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107, 2962 (2010)] shows that hu...
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called ‘stochastic slowd...
The paper examines the behaviour of "evolutionary " models with s-noise like those which h...
Mixed-strategy equilibria are typically rather unstable in evolutionary game theory. "Monocyclic" ga...
Without mutation and migration, evolutionary dynamics ultimately leads to the extinction of all but ...
This paper studies the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium selection in 2-by-2 symmetri...
In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding u...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjus...
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occ...
Evolution, Switching costs, Mixed-strategy equilibrium, Cycles, Stochastic stability,
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper models stochastic evolutionary coordination games with inertia driven by switching costs....
This paper models the phenomenon of inertia driven by individual strategy switching costs in a stoch...
A recent experimental study [Traulsen et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107, 2962 (2010)] shows that hu...
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called ‘stochastic slowd...
The paper examines the behaviour of "evolutionary " models with s-noise like those which h...
Mixed-strategy equilibria are typically rather unstable in evolutionary game theory. "Monocyclic" ga...
Without mutation and migration, evolutionary dynamics ultimately leads to the extinction of all but ...
This paper studies the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium selection in 2-by-2 symmetri...
In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding u...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjus...
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occ...
Evolution, Switching costs, Mixed-strategy equilibrium, Cycles, Stochastic stability,