Add to ORKGThis paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing inertia states that allow Ellison's (Review of Economic Studies 67, 2000, 17-45) step-by-step evolution to occur
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pi...
Evolution, Switching costs, Mixed-strategy equilibrium, Cycles, Stochastic stability,
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper models stochastic evolutionary coordination games with inertia driven by switching costs....
This paper models the phenomenon of inertia driven by individual strategy switching costs in a stoch...
A recent experimental study [Traulsen et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107, 2962 (2010)] shows that hu...
In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding u...
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called ‘stochastic slowd...
Due to limited cognitive skills for perceptual error or other emotional reasons, players may keep th...
Mixed-strategy equilibria are typically rather unstable in evolutionary game theory. "Monocyclic" ga...
International audienceAiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term convergence...
This paper studies the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium selection in 2-by-2 symmetri...
Without mutation and migration, evolutionary dynamics ultimately leads to the extinction of all but ...
Path-dependence in coordination games may lead to lock-in on inefficient outcomes, such as adoption ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pi...
Evolution, Switching costs, Mixed-strategy equilibrium, Cycles, Stochastic stability,
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper models stochastic evolutionary coordination games with inertia driven by switching costs....
This paper models the phenomenon of inertia driven by individual strategy switching costs in a stoch...
A recent experimental study [Traulsen et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107, 2962 (2010)] shows that hu...
In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding u...
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called ‘stochastic slowd...
Due to limited cognitive skills for perceptual error or other emotional reasons, players may keep th...
Mixed-strategy equilibria are typically rather unstable in evolutionary game theory. "Monocyclic" ga...
International audienceAiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term convergence...
This paper studies the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium selection in 2-by-2 symmetri...
Without mutation and migration, evolutionary dynamics ultimately leads to the extinction of all but ...
Path-dependence in coordination games may lead to lock-in on inefficient outcomes, such as adoption ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pi...
Evolution, Switching costs, Mixed-strategy equilibrium, Cycles, Stochastic stability,