In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with an option to buy. This contract is optimal regardless of the monopolist's ability to commit and creates inefficient scrappage.Publicad
This article considers a durable goods monopolist's choice of price and durability in a setting wher...
This paper derives and evaluates the decisions of a durable good monopolist in a context where deman...
This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates sto...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
This article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist. Two models of the i...
This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable ...
This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable ...
This paper analyzes the strategic choice of variety by a monopolist seller of a durable good as a me...
This article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist. Two models of the i...
Consider a monopolist who sells a durable good, and repairs the good if it breaks down. Suppose that...
The "Swan Independence Result" states that a monopolist producer of durable goods will set product d...
Durable goods are more likely to impose binding financial constraint than the perishable goods becau...
This article considers a durable goods monopolist's choice of price and durability in a setting wher...
This paper derives and evaluates the decisions of a durable good monopolist in a context where deman...
This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates sto...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
This article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist. Two models of the i...
This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable ...
This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable ...
This paper analyzes the strategic choice of variety by a monopolist seller of a durable good as a me...
This article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist. Two models of the i...
Consider a monopolist who sells a durable good, and repairs the good if it breaks down. Suppose that...
The "Swan Independence Result" states that a monopolist producer of durable goods will set product d...
Durable goods are more likely to impose binding financial constraint than the perishable goods becau...
This article considers a durable goods monopolist's choice of price and durability in a setting wher...
This paper derives and evaluates the decisions of a durable good monopolist in a context where deman...
This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates sto...
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