Hegel in Freud: med Aufhebung in Verneinung

The paper analyses two concepts, or conceptual operations, coming from very different traditions and contexts. One is Freud’s concept of Verneinung, “negation”, developed in his short yet extraordinary piece bearing the same title, and the other is the Hegelian notion of Aufhebung, “sublation”, described by him as “one of the most important notions in philosophy.” The methodological approach consists in proposing a parallel staging of the two conceptual operations, against the background of which some of the singular, less obvious, yet absolutely crucial aspects of these two concepts, as well as of the broader theoretical settings within which they appear, come to light. The principal thesis of the article concerns the singular nature of double negation at work in both concepts: its ability to produce something new, and a singular object that does not exist outside this operation.Tekst obravnava dva koncepta, ki prihajata iz zelo različnih tradicij in kontekstov. Prvi je Freudov koncept Verneinung, »zanikanje«, ki ga razvije v kratkem, a izjemnem tekstu s tem naslovom. Drugi pa je Heglov koncept Aufhebung, torej ključna operacija dialektičnega gibanja in – kot v svoji Logiki zapiše sam Hegel – eden »najpomembnejših pojmov filozofije«. Bolj kot primerjava obeh pojmov je vodilo prispevka njuna vzporedna uprizoritev, skozi katero določene singularne, razlikujoče poteze obeh pojmov osvetljujejo druga drugo v novi in nepričakovani luči. Osnovna teza prispevka je, da imamo pri obeh konceptih opravka s podvojeno negacijo, pri čemer pa nas ta »negacija negacije« ne vrne na izhodišče, temveč obkroži oz. proizvede nek singularni objekt, ki zunaj te operacije ne obstaja