Ponavljanje med reprodukcijo in variacijo: Deleuze, Hegel, Kierkegaard

The paper departs from the thesis that the problematic relationship between Deleuze’s, Hegel’s, and Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition, which at the same time represents the ontological starting points of their philosophies, can be illuminated through the elaboration of the concepts of reproduction and variation as specific aspects of the very idea of repetition. With the help of the hypothesis that Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition can be read through a double paradox that separates repetition from reproduction, on one hand, and variation on the other, we show that this double paradox is also presented in Hegel’s dialectics. The consequence of that is that in the final analysis Hegel’s dialectics is nothing but repetition par excellence – repetition that conceptually moves away from the idea of reproduction as well as from the idea of variation. In the final part of the paper we first state that in Deleuze this double paradox of Kierkegaard does not work, which is further backed up by a statement in Difference and Repetition that variation and reproduction represent a specific functional aspect of repetition. The conclusion brings the surprising finding – in so far as Kierkegaard, besides Nietzsche, is a parade horse of Deleuze’s theory of repetition – that Kierkegaard’s conception of repetition is in fact much closer to Hegel’s dialectics than Deleuze’s project. Deleuze namely from the very start overlooks that in Kierkegaard’s conception of paradox, which represents the fundamental platform of his theory of knowledge, it is not the transcendental field of thinking as the outer limit of thought, but the very discord of the possibility of thought, the fundamental impossibility of thought, that is inscribed in its register as lack, negation, and in what is indeed crucial, the condition of the possibility of thinking as positive production and affirmation.Izhodiščna teza članka je, da je problematično razmerje med Deleuzovim, Heglovim in Kierkegaardovim konceptom ponavljanja, ki predstavlja ontološko izhodišče njihove filozofije, mogoče natančneje osvetliti skozi razdelavo konceptov reprodukcije in variacije kot specifičnih aspektov same ideje ponavljanja. S pomočjo hipoteze, da je Kierkegaardov koncept ponovitve mogoče brati skozi nek dvojni paradoks, ki ponavljanje loči od vsakršne ideje reprodukcije na eni strani in variacije na drugi strani, najprej pokažemo, da ta dvojni paradoks deluje tudi v Heglovi dialektiki. Iz tega sledi, da Heglova dialektika v nekem temelju smislu ni nič drugega kot ponavljanje par excellence – ponavljanje, ki se strukturira v konceptualnem odmiku tako od ideje reprodukcije kot od ideje variacije. V zadnjem delu članka ugotovimo, da pri Deleuzu dvojni Kierkegaardov paradoks ne deluje, kar podpremo z ugotovitvijo, da v Razliki in ponavljanju tako variacija kot reprodukcija predstavljata specifična funkcionalna aspekta ponavljanja. V zaključku pridemo do presenetljive ugotovitve – kolikor je Kierkegaard poleg Nietzscheja pač vodilni paradni konj Deleuzove teorije ponavljanja –, da je Kierkegaardova koncepcija ponavljanja precej bliže Heglovi dialektiki kot pa samemu Deleuzovemu zastavku. To, kar namreč Deleuze v izhodišču spregleda, je, da pri Kierkegaardovi koncepciji paradoksa, ki predstavlja temeljno platformo njegove teorije spoznanja, ne gre za transcendentalno polje mišljenja kot zunanjo mejo misli, temveč za notranje neskladje same možnosti mišljenja, za temeljno nemožnost misli, ki je vpisana v njen register kot manko, negacija, a je kot taka vendarle – in prav v tem je ključ – pogoj možnosti samega mišljenja kot pozitivne produkcije in afirmacije