Abstract. One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley’s (1962) “roommates problem”: is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or college admissions problem, there need not exist a stable solution to the roommates problem. However, the traditional notion of stability ignores the key physical constraint that roommates require a room, and it is therefore too restrictive. Recognition of the scarcity of rooms motivates replacing stability with Pareto optimality as the relevant solution concept. This paper proves that a Pareto optimal assignment always exists in the roommates problem, and it provides an efficient algorithm for finding a Pareto improvemen...
Since stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate...
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have prefe...
AbstractIt is known that there may not exist any stable matching for a given instance of the stable ...
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the ro...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
The stable marriage problem is that of matching n men and n women, each of whom has ranked the membe...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
This thesis examines efficiency and fairness in matching markets. We first study a generalized many-...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
The classic Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marr...
The stable roommates problem is a well-known problem of matching n people into n/2 disjoint pairs so...
We introduce a roommate market model, in which 2n people need to be assigned to n rooms, with two pe...
Since stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate...
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have prefe...
AbstractIt is known that there may not exist any stable matching for a given instance of the stable ...
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the ro...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
The stable marriage problem is that of matching n men and n women, each of whom has ranked the membe...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
This thesis examines efficiency and fairness in matching markets. We first study a generalized many-...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
The classic Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marr...
The stable roommates problem is a well-known problem of matching n people into n/2 disjoint pairs so...
We introduce a roommate market model, in which 2n people need to be assigned to n rooms, with two pe...
Since stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate...
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have prefe...
AbstractIt is known that there may not exist any stable matching for a given instance of the stable ...