Add to ORKGSince stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate problem: the bargaining set. Klijn and Massó (2003) show that the bargaining set coincides with the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings in the marriage problem. First, we show that a weakly stable matching always exists in the roommate problem. However, weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. Second, we prove that the bargaining set is always non-empty. Finally, as Klijn and Massó (2003) get for the marriage problem, we show that the bargaining set coincides with the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings in the roommate problem
The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G = (V , E ) with an edge weighting ...
This paper introduces a novel set of one-to-one matching problems: matchings subject to location res...
The stable roommates problem is a well-known problem of matching n people into n/2 disjoint pairs so...
Since stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate...
In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage ...
In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage m...
The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the c...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
In this paper we consider instances of stable matching problems, namely the classical stable marriag...
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the ro...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
AbstractA stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the stable roommates pr...
The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation,...
The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G = (V , E ) with an edge weighting ...
This paper introduces a novel set of one-to-one matching problems: matchings subject to location res...
The stable roommates problem is a well-known problem of matching n people into n/2 disjoint pairs so...
Since stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate...
In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage ...
In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage m...
The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the c...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
In this paper we consider instances of stable matching problems, namely the classical stable marriag...
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the ro...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
AbstractA stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the stable roommates pr...
The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation,...
The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G = (V , E ) with an edge weighting ...
This paper introduces a novel set of one-to-one matching problems: matchings subject to location res...
The stable roommates problem is a well-known problem of matching n people into n/2 disjoint pairs so...