We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ``lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems.roommate problem, stability, fairness
In the roommate problem, pairs of agents must be formed, based on ordinal preferences of the agents ...
This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate...
The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation,...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched...
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched...
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the ro...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
The classic Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marr...
Abstract. One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley’s (1962) “roo...
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and gi...
Since stable matchings may not exist, we propose a weaker notion of stability based on the credibili...
In the roommate problem, pairs of agents must be formed, based on ordinal preferences of the agents ...
This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate...
The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation,...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched...
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched...
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched...
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the ro...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
The classic Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marr...
Abstract. One of the oldest but least understood matching problems is Gale and Shapley’s (1962) “roo...
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and gi...
Since stable matchings may not exist, we propose a weaker notion of stability based on the credibili...
In the roommate problem, pairs of agents must be formed, based on ordinal preferences of the agents ...
This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate...
The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation,...