International audienceIn this paper, we study the problem of factoring an RSA modulus N = pq in polynomial time, when p is a weak prime, that is, p can be expressed as ap = u0 + M1u1 +. .. + M k u k for some k integers M1,. .. , M k and k + 2 suitably small parameters a, u0,. .. u k. We further compute a lower bound for the set of weak moduli, that is, moduli made of at least one weak prime, in the interval [2^(2n) , 2 ^(2(n+1)) ] and show that this number is much larger than the set of RSA prime factors satisfying Coppersmith's conditions, effectively extending the likelihood for factoring RSA moduli. We also prolong our findings to moduli composed of two weak primes
Abstract. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus where p, q are large primes of the same bitsize and φ(N) = (...
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the ...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the problem of factoring an RSA modulus N = pq in poly...
Factoring large integers is a fundamental problem in algebraic number theory and modern cryptography...
In their paper [9], P. Paillier and J. Villar make a conjectur e about the malleability of an RSA mo...
We revisit the factoring with known bits problem on RSA moduli. In 1996, Coppersmith showed that the...
Abstract. This paper discusses the factorization of the RSA modulus N (i.e., N = pq, where p, q are ...
Abstract. Boneh et al. showed at Crypto 99 that moduli of the form N = prq can be factored in polyno...
Abstract. Let N1 = p1q1 and N2 = p2q2 be two RSA moduli, not nec-essarily of the same bit-size. In 2...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA with the modulus N = p2 q. The first attack is based on the e...
We revisit the factoring with known bits problem on general RSA moduli in the forms of $N=p^r q^s$ f...
Abstract. Let N1 = p1q1 and N2 = p2q2 be two different RSA moduli. Suppose that p1 = p2 mod 2 t for ...
We give a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm that constructs an RSA modulus M=pl, where p and l...
The major RSA underlying security problems rely on the difficulty of factoring a very la...
Abstract. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus where p, q are large primes of the same bitsize and φ(N) = (...
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the ...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the problem of factoring an RSA modulus N = pq in poly...
Factoring large integers is a fundamental problem in algebraic number theory and modern cryptography...
In their paper [9], P. Paillier and J. Villar make a conjectur e about the malleability of an RSA mo...
We revisit the factoring with known bits problem on RSA moduli. In 1996, Coppersmith showed that the...
Abstract. This paper discusses the factorization of the RSA modulus N (i.e., N = pq, where p, q are ...
Abstract. Boneh et al. showed at Crypto 99 that moduli of the form N = prq can be factored in polyno...
Abstract. Let N1 = p1q1 and N2 = p2q2 be two RSA moduli, not nec-essarily of the same bit-size. In 2...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA with the modulus N = p2 q. The first attack is based on the e...
We revisit the factoring with known bits problem on general RSA moduli in the forms of $N=p^r q^s$ f...
Abstract. Let N1 = p1q1 and N2 = p2q2 be two different RSA moduli. Suppose that p1 = p2 mod 2 t for ...
We give a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm that constructs an RSA modulus M=pl, where p and l...
The major RSA underlying security problems rely on the difficulty of factoring a very la...
Abstract. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus where p, q are large primes of the same bitsize and φ(N) = (...
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the ...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...