We revisit the factoring with known bits problem on RSA moduli. In 1996, Coppersmith showed that the RSA modulus N = pq with balanced p, q can be efficiently factored, if the high order ¼log₂ N bits of one prime factor is given. Later, this important result is also generalized to the factorization of RSA variants moduli such as N = p r q or N = p₁ p₂ · · · p n. In 2000, Lim et al. proposed a new RSA variant with the modulus of the form N = p r q s, which is much faster in the decryption process than the standard RSA. Then from 2015 to 2018, in order to investigate the security property of this RSA variant, Lu et al. and Coron et al. have presented three works studying the polynomial-time factorization of N = p r q s with partial known bits...
Recently Sarkar (DCC 2014) has proposed a new attack on small decryption exponent when RSA Modulus...
International audienceWe consider four variants of the RSA cryptosystem with an RSA modulus N = pq w...
This paper reports four new cryptanalytic attacks which show that t instances of RSA moduli Ns = psq...
We revisit the factoring with known bits problem on general RSA moduli in the forms of $N=p^r q^s$ f...
Abstract. This paper discusses the factorization of the RSA modulus N (i.e., N = pq, where p, q are ...
The major RSA underlying security problems rely on the difficulty of factoring a very la...
Factoring large integers is a fundamental problem in algebraic number theory and modern cryptography...
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the ...
Abstract. Let N1 = p1q1 and N2 = p2q2 be two RSA moduli, not nec-essarily of the same bit-size. In 2...
We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge...
We report on our discovery of an algorithmic flaw in the construction of primes for RSA key generati...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
Factorization is notoriously difficult. Though the problem is not known to be NP-hard, neither effic...
Abstract. We present lattice-based attacks on RSA with prime factors p and q of unbalanced size. In ...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA with the modulus N = p2 q. The first attack is based on the e...
Recently Sarkar (DCC 2014) has proposed a new attack on small decryption exponent when RSA Modulus...
International audienceWe consider four variants of the RSA cryptosystem with an RSA modulus N = pq w...
This paper reports four new cryptanalytic attacks which show that t instances of RSA moduli Ns = psq...
We revisit the factoring with known bits problem on general RSA moduli in the forms of $N=p^r q^s$ f...
Abstract. This paper discusses the factorization of the RSA modulus N (i.e., N = pq, where p, q are ...
The major RSA underlying security problems rely on the difficulty of factoring a very la...
Factoring large integers is a fundamental problem in algebraic number theory and modern cryptography...
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the ...
Abstract. Let N1 = p1q1 and N2 = p2q2 be two RSA moduli, not nec-essarily of the same bit-size. In 2...
We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge...
We report on our discovery of an algorithmic flaw in the construction of primes for RSA key generati...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
Factorization is notoriously difficult. Though the problem is not known to be NP-hard, neither effic...
Abstract. We present lattice-based attacks on RSA with prime factors p and q of unbalanced size. In ...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA with the modulus N = p2 q. The first attack is based on the e...
Recently Sarkar (DCC 2014) has proposed a new attack on small decryption exponent when RSA Modulus...
International audienceWe consider four variants of the RSA cryptosystem with an RSA modulus N = pq w...
This paper reports four new cryptanalytic attacks which show that t instances of RSA moduli Ns = psq...