Data-driven model training is increasingly relying on finding Nash equilibria with provable techniques, e.g., for GANs and multi-agent RL. In this paper, we analyse a new extra-gradient method, that performs gradient extrapolations and updates on a random subset of players at each iteration. This approach provably exhibits the same rate of convergence as full extra-gradient in non-smooth convex games. We propose an additional variance reduction mechanism for this to hold for smooth convex games. Our approach makes extrapolation amenable to massive multiplayer settings, and brings empirical speed-ups, in particular when using cyclic sampling schemes. We demonstrate the efficiency of player sampling on large-scale non-smooth and non-strictly ...
This dissertation studies multi-agent algorithms for learning Nash equilibrium strategies in games w...
Recent models of learning in games have attempted to produce individual-level learning algorithms th...
Abstract — We consider a continuous-time form of repeated matrix games in which player strategies ev...
This work studies Nash equilibrium seeking for a class of stochastic aggregative games, where each p...
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to ...
Abstract — We consider multiplayer repeated matrix games in which several players seek to increase t...
International audienceIn this paper, we examine the convergence rate of a wide range of regularized ...
We study the effect of the stochastic gradient noise on the training of generative adversarial netwo...
39 pages, 6 figures, 1 tableWe develop a unified stochastic approximation framework for analyzing th...
Many important problems in contemporary machine learning involve solving highly non- convex problems...
We address scaling up equilibrium computation in Mean Field Games (MFGs) using Online Mirror Descent...
In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act ef-fectively, but sophisticated multi-a...
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-pla...
Abstract In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act effectively, but sophisticated...
Hirsch [2], is called smooth fictitious play. Using techniques from stochastic approximation by the ...
This dissertation studies multi-agent algorithms for learning Nash equilibrium strategies in games w...
Recent models of learning in games have attempted to produce individual-level learning algorithms th...
Abstract — We consider a continuous-time form of repeated matrix games in which player strategies ev...
This work studies Nash equilibrium seeking for a class of stochastic aggregative games, where each p...
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to ...
Abstract — We consider multiplayer repeated matrix games in which several players seek to increase t...
International audienceIn this paper, we examine the convergence rate of a wide range of regularized ...
We study the effect of the stochastic gradient noise on the training of generative adversarial netwo...
39 pages, 6 figures, 1 tableWe develop a unified stochastic approximation framework for analyzing th...
Many important problems in contemporary machine learning involve solving highly non- convex problems...
We address scaling up equilibrium computation in Mean Field Games (MFGs) using Online Mirror Descent...
In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act ef-fectively, but sophisticated multi-a...
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-pla...
Abstract In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act effectively, but sophisticated...
Hirsch [2], is called smooth fictitious play. Using techniques from stochastic approximation by the ...
This dissertation studies multi-agent algorithms for learning Nash equilibrium strategies in games w...
Recent models of learning in games have attempted to produce individual-level learning algorithms th...
Abstract — We consider a continuous-time form of repeated matrix games in which player strategies ev...