Dewey on Society and Action

A fight for human rights is the skeleton of democracy both as an ideology and as an inspiration of social action. From its very onset, liberalism has been fighting for democracy, building upon, first and foremost, natural law (Hobbes). After critiques in the 18th and the 19th century, one of the constituents of natural law - freedom - became fundamental in contract law (Rousseau, Locke, Kant), as well as in the American Declaration of Independence. The second constituent of natural law - ownership - became the starting point of utilitarianism in the 19th century (Bentham, J. Mill). Thus, the greatest ancient ethical virtue, goodness (Plato), became well-being; it became an economic category- prosperity. This is the root of laissez- faire liberalism, early liberalism. New liberalism, which is usually called social liberalism, and which, according to Feibelmann, emerged according to the logic of economic affairs, revives the above mentioned contract constituent. The intention of this article is to present Dewey’s correct understanding of both utilitarianism (good assessment of J. S. Mill’s ‘indirect’ utilitarianism) and the first unsuccessful turn to new liberalism (Green). This intention is focused on emphasising Dewey’s topicality, particularly if one keeps in mind the fact that the most successful theory of liberalism so-far, namely that of J. Rawls (regardless of the criticisms, especially by communitarianism), is, in fact, rooted in his theses - a theory which unites the contractual and utilitarian conceptions of human rights. Further- more, Dewey’s (1935) conception of liberalism and social action is emphasised in comparison to Rawls’ theory of justice (1971), not in respect of greater theoretic consistency, but in respect of their practical consequences