For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of a monotone selection are obtained. (1) The correspondence is weakly ascending while every value satisfies a completeness condition, e.g., is chain-complete. (2) The correspondence is ascending while the target is a sublattice of the Cartesian product of a finite number of chains. (3) Both source and target are chains while the correspondence is generated by the maximization of a strongly acyclic interval order with the single crossing property. The theorems give new sufficient conditions for the existence of (epsilon) Nash equilibria
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
On a partially ordered set a preference relation is given, which depends on an exogenous parame-ter,...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
An ordering on a lattice is quasisupermodular if and only if inserting it into any parametric optimi...
An ordering on a lattice is quasisupermodular if and only if inserting it into any parametric optimi...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
Consider a class of exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly mono...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
On a partially ordered set a preference relation is given, which depends on an exogenous parame-ter,...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
An ordering on a lattice is quasisupermodular if and only if inserting it into any parametric optimi...
An ordering on a lattice is quasisupermodular if and only if inserting it into any parametric optimi...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
Consider a class of exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly mono...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...