Add to ORKGWe study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the indifference relation(s) need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where strategy sets are chains, but monotone selections from the best response correspondences need not exist
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
The intuitive idea of two activities being complements, for example tea and lemon, is that increasin...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We carry out a revealed preference analysis of monotone comparative statics. We ask what restriction...
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic comp...
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic comp...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria ...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
The intuitive idea of two activities being complements, for example tea and lemon, is that increasin...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the in...
We carry out a revealed preference analysis of monotone comparative statics. We ask what restriction...
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic comp...
I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic comp...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the pl...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria ...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
The intuitive idea of two activities being complements, for example tea and lemon, is that increasin...