Add to ORKGOn a partially ordered set a preference relation is given, which depends on an exogenous parame-ter, the choices of other agents. Various definitions of monotonicity of optimal choices are considered, and restrictions on preferences that ensure monotonicity in one sense or other are obtained. The problem of the existence of monotone selections and fixed points (Nash equilibria) is also studied. JEL Classification Numbers: C 72; D 71. Key words: Best response correspondence; single crossing conditions; quasisupermodular prefer
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
We carry out a revealed preference analysis of monotone comparative statics. We ask what restriction...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
We carry out a revealed preference analysis of monotone comparative statics. We ask what restriction...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions ar...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions ...
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
We carry out a revealed preference analysis of monotone comparative statics. We ask what restriction...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...