A critical reappraisal of Walrasian-Paretian theory of value, distribution and welfare: In search of its relevance for economic justice as well as empirical validity

The objective of this dissertation is to attempt at a reappraisal of Walrasian-Paretian theory of value, distribution and welfare in comparison with alternative theories--mainly in Marxian, Marshallian and Institutionalist traditions in search of all theories\u27 relevance for economic justice as well as empirical validity. I suppose that Walrasian theory of value and distribution is fundamentally subjective and static. If the subjective theory of value is pressed so hard, only consumers\u27 standpoint is likely to be regarded as important because any goods can have exchange values if only consumers\u27 marginal utilities of the goods are positive without any relevance for whether or not human labor and efforts have been expended to producing them. If this principle is expanded to the distribution of income and wealth, some kinds of earnings and wealth can be made without any relevance to whether or not human labor and efforts have been expended to making them. I would also emphasize that it seems to me very strange that modern Walrasian-Paretian general equilibrium theorists insist that in the theory of economic welfare, it is impossible to measure cardinal utility, while in the theory of uncertainty, it is possible; and in the theory of capital, it is possible to measure the value of aggregate capital independent of the relations of distribution. I emphasize this aspect because I regard the device of ordinal utility theory and its application to Paretian welfare economics as an unnecessary, would-be absurd aberration in the theory of value and welfare detriment to egalitarian economic justice. I would also point out that the empirical validity of Walrasian general equilibrium theory is very weak. The existence and stability of general equilibrium cannot be attained when tatonnement process cannot work effectively because of the absence of auctioneers. I would temporarily conclude that modern Walrasian-Paretian economics neither correctly explain the determination of value, prices, welfare and distribution nor seriously propose any prescription for the betterment of welfare or distribution state for the majority of human beings