The postulates of freedom, the immortality of the soul and God in Immanuel Kant's The critique of pure practical reason

This paper examines and defends Kant's arguments that the ideas of freedom, the immortality of the soul and God are postulates of pure practical reason in Immanuel Kant's the Critique of Pure Practical Reason (CPracR). The scope of this paper is limited to an examination of these arguments in the context of this work. In my view the CPracR does not attempt to establish propositions of empirically verifiable fact about men and the world, nor does it attempt to prove certain metaphysical positions. I interpret this work as Kant's attempt to explain and clarify the common man's moral discourse rather than to provide a proof of moral action. In this context I argue that Kant's analysis of the common man's moral judgment shows that the postulates of pure practical reason are inseparably connected to his law of pure practical reason, also referred to as the principle of morality. The problem that Kant says the CPracR needs to explain is how pure reason can be practical. I argue that Kant explains this by arguing that we regard ourselves as making decisions based on thought as well as decisions based upon our experiences in the sensible world. He then elaborates a conceptual structure in an attempt to clarify what he understands by consciousness of the moral law. Kant argues that the object of pure practical reason is the highest good. I argue that the highest original good is the archetype of practical perfection and the measure of man's moral progress; and that man's real moral object is endless moral progress towards the model of moral perfection, holiness. Man may only ever approximates the highest original good. I reject objections that the highest good is a superfluous element in Kant's moral theory as well as the view that the goal of man's moral action is happiness for all. Contrary to standard interpretations, I argue that a vital premise of Kant's argument for the immortality of the soul, viz., that holiness is the condition of the highest good for man, has been misinterpreted and that a new interpretation renders this argument coherent. In conclusion, I argue that Kant's arguments that the ideas of freedom, the immortality of the soul and God are postulates of pure practical reason in the CPracR are cogent and coherent