Kant And The Practical Freedom In The Critique Of Pure Reason [kant E A Liberdade Prática Na Crítica Da Razão Pura]

Kant structured his philosophy as to be possible for one to affirm we are beings that are part of the sensitive world and, as such, have all of our behaviors naturally explained. However, he also supported that we are beings with a rational capacity for representing how the world ought to be, and this rational capacity allows us to have all our decisions accessed in a way that is free from how the world actually is. In this paper we examine Kant's view in certain texts of the "rst Critique where he differentiates transcendental freedom (or freedom as spontaneity) from practical freedom, understood as free-will, one that can determine itself by representation of reason. Based on these texts and on some of Allison's commentaries (1982), we will see that freedom, in a practical sense, is differentiated from freedom in a cos-mological sense, being on one hand compatible with the determinism of the natural causes that operates with the explanation of phenomena (and the human will is a kind of sensitive arbitrium); On the other hand, Kant's conception maintains or subsumes a common notion of human freedom as deliberation and accountable decision - in a sense that it would not be pathologically determined by sensitive immediate motives. "The issue round transcendental freedom concerns uniquely to speculative knowledge, and we can put it aside when dealing with the practical [issue]" (CPR B 831-832).2434177188Allison, H.E., Practical and transcendental freedom in the critique of pure reason (1982) Kant-Studien, 3 (2), pp. 271-290Kant, I., (1988) Critíca da razao pura, , São Paulo: Nova CulturalKant, I., (1980) Fundamentcão da metafísica dos costumes, , São Paulo: Abril CulturalKant, I., (1956) Critique of practical reason, , New York: Liberal ArtsSchneewind, J.B., Autonomy, obligation and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral philosophy (1992) The Cambridge companion to Kant, pp. 309-341. , GUYER, P. Cambridge: Cambridge University PressDennett, D.C., (2003) A liberdade evolui, , Lisboa: Temas e DebatesTaylor, R., Liberdade. Rio de Janeiro: J. Zahar e determinismo (1969) Metafísica, pp. 53-79. , TAYLOR, RO'neill, O., (1995) Constructions of reason, , Cambridge: Cambridge University PressO'neill, O., Kantian Ethics (1994) A companion to ethics, pp. 259-269. , SingerRodhen, V., (1981) Interesse da razão e liberdade, , São Paulo: ÁticaWalker, R., (1999) Kant, , New York: RoutledgeWatson, G., Will (1995) A companion to metaphysics, pp. 175-182. , KIM. Sosa J. EWolff, R.P., The First Critique Background of the Groundwork (1986) The Autonomy of Reason: a commentary on Kant's groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 5-24. , WOLFF R. P. Gloucester: Peter Smit