Add to ORKGAbstract. We analyze a continuous version of the Gale-Shapley matching prob-lem. Men and women are represented by a d-dimensional vector of characteristics (such as intelligence, beauty, wealth, etc.) and their preferences over matches with the opposite sex depend only on the respective characteristics. We assume that preferences are monotonic. We show that each di¤erentiable and pairwise stable matching has to satisfy a system of partial di¤erential equations. For generic values of parameters, there exists at most one smooth (i.e., analytic) stable matching. 1
The stable matching problem is that of matching twosets of agents in such a manner that no two unmat...
This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided ma...
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think o...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
Abstract. In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, we present an algorithm ...
The stable matching problem (also known as the stable marriage problem) is a well-known problem of m...
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, and each m...
The stable marriage problem is a classical matching problem introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is kn...
Stable matching is a widely studied problem in social choice theory. For the basiccentralized case, ...
The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) is concerned with the follow scenario: suppose we have two disjoin...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
The stable matching problem is that of matching twosets of agents in such a manner that no two unmat...
This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided ma...
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think o...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
Abstract. In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, we present an algorithm ...
The stable matching problem (also known as the stable marriage problem) is a well-known problem of m...
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, and each m...
The stable marriage problem is a classical matching problem introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is kn...
Stable matching is a widely studied problem in social choice theory. For the basiccentralized case, ...
The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) is concerned with the follow scenario: suppose we have two disjoin...
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one indiv...
The stable matching problem is that of matching twosets of agents in such a manner that no two unmat...
This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided ma...
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think o...