Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think of one of the sets as containing men and the other as containing women. Each person must rank the members of the opposite gender in their order of preference. The goal is then to create a set of man-woman couples with the following stability property: It is impossible to find a man and a woman who prefer each other over their respective partners in the set of couples. A set of couples having this property is called a stable matching. Such matchings can be found using the Gale-Shapley algorithm. In this thesis, we discuss the history of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. We also state and prove some theorems which establish the most important properti...
AbstractWe study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the m...
AbstractWe examine several results for the stable marriage problem and show that they do not hold if...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage problem, stable match...
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think o...
The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of...
AbstractThis paper demonstrates that the celebrated Gale-Shapley algorithm for obtaining stable matc...
Abstract—A stable marriage problem (SMP) of size n involves n men and n women, each of whom has orde...
The stable marriage problem is to find a matching between men and women, considering preference list...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
.The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and wom...
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, and each m...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and wom...
We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or th...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
AbstractWe study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the m...
AbstractWe examine several results for the stable marriage problem and show that they do not hold if...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage problem, stable match...
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal size. We can think o...
The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of...
AbstractThis paper demonstrates that the celebrated Gale-Shapley algorithm for obtaining stable matc...
Abstract—A stable marriage problem (SMP) of size n involves n men and n women, each of whom has orde...
The stable marriage problem is to find a matching between men and women, considering preference list...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
.The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and wom...
In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved that, for any equal number of men and women, and each m...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and wom...
We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or th...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
AbstractWe study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the m...
AbstractWe examine several results for the stable marriage problem and show that they do not hold if...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage problem, stable match...