Add to ORKG[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no two unmatched agents prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. In this paper we present some special kinds of preference patterns and discuss the elementary properties for stable matching instances with these specific preference patterns
AbstractWe examine several results for the stable marriage problem and show that they do not hold if...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
The stable matching problem is that of matching twosets of agents in such a manner that no two unmat...
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are p...
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are p...
We study a two-sided matching problem under preferences, where the agents have independent pairwise ...
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are p...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only...
In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
AbstractWe examine several results for the stable marriage problem and show that they do not hold if...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
The stable matching problem is that of matching twosets of agents in such a manner that no two unmat...
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are p...
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are p...
We study a two-sided matching problem under preferences, where the agents have independent pairwise ...
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are p...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only...
In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
AbstractWe examine several results for the stable marriage problem and show that they do not hold if...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...