Abstract: In this paper we deal with several classes of simple games; the first class is the one of ordered simple games (i.e. they admit of a complete desirability relation). The second class consists of all zero-sum games in the first one. First of all we introduce a "natural " partial order on both classes respectively and prove that this order relation admits a rank function. Also the first class turns out to be a rank symmetric lattice. These order relations induce fast algorithms to generate both classes of ordered games. Next we focus on the class of weighted majority games with n persons, which can be mapped onto the class of weighted majority zero-sum games with n + 1 persons. To this end, we use in addition methods of li...
In many multiagent settings, situations arise in which agents must collectively make decisions while...
AbstractWe study the determinacy of the game Gκ(A) introduced in Fuchino, Koppelberg and Shelah (to ...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
The aim of the paper is to use some known results of the theory of boolean functions and of the theo...
ABSTRACT. A natural partial ordering exists on all weighted games and, more broadly, on all linear g...
In this paper, we analyze the frequency distributions of weights and quotas in weighted majority vot...
This paper presents some new results about majority games. Isbell (1959) was the first to find a maj...
This project will be focused around the theory of Simple Games, weighted Voting Games will be of spe...
A basic problem in the theory of simple games and other fields is to study whether a simple game (Bo...
Tomiyama [Tomiyama, Y., 1987. Simple game, voting representation and ordinal power equivalence. Inte...
In this paper, we analyze the frequency distributions of weights and quotas in weighted majority vot...
Krohn I, Sudhölter P. Directed and weighted majority games. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematica...
This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a simple game as the intersection...
Rosenmüller J. Weighted majority games and the matrix of homogeneity. Working Papers. Institute of M...
In many multiagent settings, situations arise in which agents must collectively make decisions while...
AbstractWe study the determinacy of the game Gκ(A) introduced in Fuchino, Koppelberg and Shelah (to ...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
The aim of the paper is to use some known results of the theory of boolean functions and of the theo...
ABSTRACT. A natural partial ordering exists on all weighted games and, more broadly, on all linear g...
In this paper, we analyze the frequency distributions of weights and quotas in weighted majority vot...
This paper presents some new results about majority games. Isbell (1959) was the first to find a maj...
This project will be focused around the theory of Simple Games, weighted Voting Games will be of spe...
A basic problem in the theory of simple games and other fields is to study whether a simple game (Bo...
Tomiyama [Tomiyama, Y., 1987. Simple game, voting representation and ordinal power equivalence. Inte...
In this paper, we analyze the frequency distributions of weights and quotas in weighted majority vot...
Krohn I, Sudhölter P. Directed and weighted majority games. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematica...
This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a simple game as the intersection...
Rosenmüller J. Weighted majority games and the matrix of homogeneity. Working Papers. Institute of M...
In many multiagent settings, situations arise in which agents must collectively make decisions while...
AbstractWe study the determinacy of the game Gκ(A) introduced in Fuchino, Koppelberg and Shelah (to ...
Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. ...