ABSTRACT. A natural partial ordering exists on all weighted games and, more broadly, on all linear games. We describe several properties of the partially ordered sets formed by these games and utilize this perspective to enumerate proper linear games with one generator. We introduce a geometric approach to weighted voting by considering the convex polytope of all possible realizations of a weighted game and connect this geometric perspective to the weighted games poset in several ways. In particular, we prove that generic vertical lines in Cn, the union of all weighted n-voter polytopes, correspond to maximal saturated chains in the poset of weighted games, i.e., the poset is a blueprint for how the polytopes fit together to form Cn. Finall...
We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every ...
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0212-3.In th...
Weighted voting is built around the idea that voters have differing amounts of influence in election...
This paper seeks to expand voting power theory, a branch of game theory that applies to many importa...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
Weighted voting games are simple games that can be represented by a collection of integer weights fo...
We investigate voting systems with two classes of voters, for which there is a hierarchy giving each...
This project will be focused around the theory of Simple Games, weighted Voting Games will be of spe...
We study the power index voting game design problem for weighted voting games: the problem of findin...
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are an important mechanism for modeling scenarios where a group of agen...
In many multiagent settings, situations arise in which agents must collectively make decisions while...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
In voting systems, game theory, switching functions, threshold logic, hypergraphs or coherent struct...
Abstract: In this paper we deal with several classes of simple games; the first class is the one of ...
We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every ...
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0212-3.In th...
Weighted voting is built around the idea that voters have differing amounts of influence in election...
This paper seeks to expand voting power theory, a branch of game theory that applies to many importa...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
Weighted voting games are simple games that can be represented by a collection of integer weights fo...
We investigate voting systems with two classes of voters, for which there is a hierarchy giving each...
This project will be focused around the theory of Simple Games, weighted Voting Games will be of spe...
We study the power index voting game design problem for weighted voting games: the problem of findin...
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are an important mechanism for modeling scenarios where a group of agen...
In many multiagent settings, situations arise in which agents must collectively make decisions while...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
In voting systems, game theory, switching functions, threshold logic, hypergraphs or coherent struct...
Abstract: In this paper we deal with several classes of simple games; the first class is the one of ...
We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every ...
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0212-3.In th...
Weighted voting is built around the idea that voters have differing amounts of influence in election...