In the classical herding literature, agents receive a private signal regarding a binary state of nature, and sequentially choose an action, after observing the actions of their predecessors. When the informativeness of private signals is unbounded, it is known that agents converge to the correct action and correct belief. We study how quickly convergence occurs, and show that it happens more slowly than it does when agents observe signals. However, we also show that the speed of learning from actions can be arbitrarily close to the speed of learning from signals. In particular, the expected time until the agents stop taking the wrong action can be either finite or infinite, depending on the private signal distribution. In the canonical case...
We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash equilib...
We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown unde...
Abstract. We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as we...
In the classical herding literature, agents receive a private signal regarding a binary state of nat...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
In the classic herding model, agents receive private signals about an underlying binary state of nat...
We study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives ...
When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors...
We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the ...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each ot...
This thesis offers a contribution to the study of Social Learning and Networks. It studies informati...
We study a standard model of economic agents on the nodes of a social network graph who learn a bina...
We study social learning by boundedly rational agents. Agents take a decision in sequence, after obs...
Consider a finite, normal form game G in which each player position is occupied by a population of N...
We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash equilib...
We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown unde...
Abstract. We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as we...
In the classical herding literature, agents receive a private signal regarding a binary state of nat...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
In the classic herding model, agents receive private signals about an underlying binary state of nat...
We study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives ...
When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors...
We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the ...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each ot...
This thesis offers a contribution to the study of Social Learning and Networks. It studies informati...
We study a standard model of economic agents on the nodes of a social network graph who learn a bina...
We study social learning by boundedly rational agents. Agents take a decision in sequence, after obs...
Consider a finite, normal form game G in which each player position is occupied by a population of N...
We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash equilib...
We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown unde...
Abstract. We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as we...