AbstractNo-regret is described as one framework that game theorists and computer scientists have converged upon for designing and evaluating multi-agent learning algorithms. However, Shoham, Powers, and Grenager also point out that the framework has serious deficiencies, such as behaving sub-optimally against certain reactive opponents. But all is not lost. With some simple modifications, regret-minimizing algorithms can perform in many of the ways we wish multi-agent learning algorithms to perform, providing safety and adaptability against reactive opponents. We argue that the research community should have no regrets about no-regret methods
This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit feedback in non-cooperative concav...
We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with...
This paper proposes a novel multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm Nash- learning with r...
AbstractNo-regret is described as one framework that game theorists and computer scientists have con...
International audienceIn game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their ...
Online learning or sequential decision making is formally defined as a repeated game between an adve...
International audienceIn game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their ...
This paper explores a fundamental connection between computational learning theory and game theory t...
AbstractA great deal of theoretical effort in multiagent learning involves either embracing or avoid...
LNAI 9992We propose a novel adaptive reinforcement learning (RL) procedure for multi-agent non-coope...
Regret minimizing strategies for repeated games have been receiving increasing attention in the lite...
Discounted-sum games provide a formal model for the study of reinforcement learning, where the agent...
Recently, Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (DFG) (NeurIPS`21) showed that if all agents in a mult...
International audienceWe examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in ...
International audienceWe examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in ...
This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit feedback in non-cooperative concav...
We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with...
This paper proposes a novel multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm Nash- learning with r...
AbstractNo-regret is described as one framework that game theorists and computer scientists have con...
International audienceIn game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their ...
Online learning or sequential decision making is formally defined as a repeated game between an adve...
International audienceIn game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their ...
This paper explores a fundamental connection between computational learning theory and game theory t...
AbstractA great deal of theoretical effort in multiagent learning involves either embracing or avoid...
LNAI 9992We propose a novel adaptive reinforcement learning (RL) procedure for multi-agent non-coope...
Regret minimizing strategies for repeated games have been receiving increasing attention in the lite...
Discounted-sum games provide a formal model for the study of reinforcement learning, where the agent...
Recently, Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (DFG) (NeurIPS`21) showed that if all agents in a mult...
International audienceWe examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in ...
International audienceWe examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in ...
This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit feedback in non-cooperative concav...
We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with...
This paper proposes a novel multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm Nash- learning with r...